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Comment
Note
Assumption of Risk in a Comparative Negligence
System-Doctrinal, Practical, and Policy Issues:
Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc.;
Blackburn v. Dorta
There is always an easy solution to every problem-
neat, plausible, and wrong.'
The adoption of a new principle of law invariably impinges upon
related legal concepts, raising issue that were not considered when the
law was changed. The adoption of comparative negligence, a drastic
departure from the long-held principle of contributory negligence, has
forced courts to consider how the related concept of assumption of risk is
affected by the change. Because there are different types of assumption of
risk, and various doctrinal, practical, and policy issues, a proper
determination of the role for assumption of risk in a comparative
negligence system depends upon a thorough examination of many relevant
considerations. Unfortunately, two 1977 state supreme court decisions
dealt with the effect of comparative negligence upon the assumption of risk
defense without the necessary sensitivity to the complex issues that were
lurking beneath the surface. In Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club,
Inc.,2 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the adoption of
comparative negligence3 had no effect on the defense of assumption of risk,
which would remain a complete bar to recovery. The Florida Supreme
Court has taken a diametrically opposite view; in Blackburn v. Dorta,4 the
court largely abolished assumption of risk as an independent defense in
light of the advent of comparative negligence.!
This Comment will present a framework for analyzing the problem
presented by the interaction of two legal concepts-assumption of risk and
comparative negligence-and will demonstrate analytical weaknesses in
the reasoning of the Kennedy and Blackburn courts The Comment will
suggest that a productive resolution of the question can be made only by
I. Attributed to Henry L. Mencken (source unknown).
2. 376 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1977).
3. Rhode Island had adopted comparative negligence by statate. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4
(Supp. 1977).
4. 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
5. The Florida Supreme Court had judicially adopted comparative negligence in Hoffman v.
Jones, 230 So. 2d 431 (Fla..1973).
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
carefully distinguishing several types of assumption of risk, and by
thoroughly examining issues of legal doctrine, practical implementation,
and public policy, issues that often differ markedly depending upon the
type of assumption of risk under consideration.
I. THE FACTS AND HOLDINGS OF THE CASES
A. Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc.
Sylvia Kennedy was an avid hockey fan who had attended numerous
games with her fiance at the Rhode Island Auditorium.6 In the course of
one such game, the hockey puck flew from the ice during a face-off and
sailed toward Mrs. Kennedy's unprotected fourth row seat, striking her
above the left eye. Having been seriously injured and having suffered
substantial damages, she brought suit against the Providence Hockey
Club, Inc., alleging that the club negligently failed to apprise her of the
danger and afford her a safe seat.8 The trial court granted summary
judgment to the defendant hockey club, and the Rhode Island Supreme
Court affirmed, on the basis that Mrs. Kennedy had assumed the risk of
being injured and was therefore barred from any recovery.9 The court
found that Rhode Island's adoption of comparative negligence had no
effect on the complete defense of assumption of risk.'0
B. Blackburn v. Dorta
In Blackburn v. Dorta, the Florida Supreme Court dealt with three
separate cases consolidated for purposes of the court's certiorari review.
In Dorta v. Blackburn," a Florida intermediate court of appeals had
recognized the continued validity of assumption of risk as a complete bar
to recovery despite the adoption of comparative negligence. The case
involved a minor plaintiff, injured while riding as a voluntary passenger in
a dune buggy, who alleged that the defendant driver of the buggy, also a
minor, had negligently operated the vehicle.12  Rea v. Leadership
Housing, Inc. 3 had reached a contrary result, with a different court of
appeals holding that assumption of risk was now but a type of contributory
negligence that would not operate as a complete bar, but that would
instead be subject to comparison under the principles of comparative
negligence. The plaintiff in Rea alleged that the defendant builder of the
plaintiff's new residence had been negligent in leaving two large holes in
6. 376 A.2d at 331.
7. Id.
8. Id. Mrs. Kennedy's then-fiance and now-husband sought consequential damages as a co-
plaintiff. The complaint also charged a breach of warranty relating to anallegedlydefectiveseat. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 332.
11. 302 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
12. Id. at 451.
13. 312 So. 2d 818 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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the plaintiff's driveway. Even though the plaintiff was fully aware of the
existence of the holes and even though there was enough room in the
driveway to avoid them, the plaintiff had put her foot into one of the holes,
falling and breaking her hip.14  In the third case, Parker v. Maule
Industries, Inc.,' 5 still another court of appeals had dealt with the issue,
finding itself in agreement with Rea. In Parker, the plaintiff passenger
alleged that a truck driver with whom he had been riding negligently
caused the plaintiff to suffer injuries in a fall from the truck.' 6 The Florida
Supreme Court sided with the intermediate appellate decisions in Rea and
Parker, holding that the assumption of risk defense was generally
abrogated as an independent entity and was merged with contributory
negligence, being thus made subject to comparative negligence princi-
ples. 17 The court excepted from this abrogation and merger "express
assumption of risk which is a contractual concept"; 8 the court expressed
no opinion on the continued validity and effect of this aspect of assumption
of risk. 19
II. THE BASIC LEGAL CONCEPTS PRESENTED
A. Assumption of Risk
Assumption of risk as a defense in negligence actions has traditionally
been kept separate from the defense of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence has typically been described as negligent
conduct on the part of the plaintiff that contributes to an injury also caused
in part by the defendant's negligence.2 A contributorily negligent
plaintiff is one who, by objective, "reasonable man" standards, is found to
have acted unreasonably under the circumstances,2' thereby becoming the
partial author of his own wrong. On the other hand, assumption of risk
has traditionally been determined by a subjective test, the reasonableness
of the plaintiff's conduct being immaterial.22 Although the term
"assumption of risk" has been used indiscriminately, it is most
meaningfully used to describe the conduct of a plaintiff who voluntarily
and consciously encounters a known risk of harm, which risk was created
by the defendant's conduct, and thereby incurs an injury.23 There is an
14. Id. at 819.
15. 321 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
16. Id. at 107.
17. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 293 (Fla. 1977).
18. Id. at 290. For a definition of express assumption of risk, see text accompanying note 27
infra.
19. 348 So. 2d at 290.
20. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 416-17 (4th ed. 1971),
21. Id. at 418-19.
22. Id. § 68, at 447-48.
23. Seeid.at447. "The essence of contributory negligence is carelessness; of assumption of risk,
venturousness." Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W. Va. 215, 217, 193 S.E. 57, 58 (1937).
[Vol. 39:364
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overlap between contributory negligence and assumption of risk when the
plaintiff acts both knowingly and unreasonably. 24  Under traditional
rules, however, whether a defense is labeled "contributory negligence" or
"assumption of risk" is of academic interest only, because either defense
completely bars the plaintiff from recovery.25
Assumption of risk has been classified into as many as six different
types.26 To determine the effect of comparative negligence on the
assumption of risk defense, three categories will suffice: (1) express
assumption of risk, (2) reasonable implied assumption of risk, and (3)
unreasonable implied assumption of risk. Express assumption of risk is
present when the plaintiff expressly agrees to assume a risk of harm from
the defendant's negligent conduct.2" A typical example is an exculpatory
clause in a contract. The term also encompasses express statements by the
plaintiff that are not part of a contract. For example, if the plaintiff makes
to the defendant an oral or written statement, not supported by
consideration, that he agrees to accept consequences that might result
from negligence by the defendant, the plaintiff has expressly assumed the
risk of any such consequences. Implied assumption of risk exists when no
express statement has been made, but the plaintiff, fully understanding a
risk of harm that could result from the defendant's negligence, nonetheless
voluntarily determines to encounter the risk confronting him.28 Depend-
ing upon the propriety of the plaintiff's decision to encounter the risk, the
implied assumption of risk is either reasonable or unreasonable. A clear
example of reasonable implied assumption of risk is presented by the facts
in Kennedy. Because Mrs. Kennedy had attended numerous hockey
games and had witnessed pucks lofted from the ice, sometimes into the
spectator seats, 29 she was found to have knowingly and voluntarily
assumed the risk of being hit by a lofted puck.30 However, given the slight
chance of being hit by a puck and the recreational utility of attending the
game, her conduct was obviously quite reasonable. On the other hand, if
24. W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 68, at 440-41. When the overlap is present, the defendant
generally can assert either defense or both. Id. at 441.
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 467, 496A (1965).
26. Professor Robert E. Keeton has identified six categories of assumption of risk. (1) express
assumption of risk, (2) subjectively consensual assumption of risk, (3) objectively consensual
assumption of risk, (4) assumption of risk by consent to conduct or condition, (5) associational
assumption of risk, and (6) imposed assumption of risk. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products
Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. Rv. 122, 123-30 (1961). Different categories and distinctions have been
suggested by other commentators. See 2 F. HARPER& F. JAMES,THE LAwoFTORTS§21.l (1956): W.
PROSSER, supra note 20, § 68, at 440.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965).
28. Id. § 496C (1965). This section of the Restatement covers both reasonable and unreasonable
implied assumption of risk; unreasonable implied assumption of risk is also encompassed within the
Restatement's definition of contributory negligence. Id. § 496C, comment g; id. § 496A. comment
d (1965).
29. Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 376 A.2d 329, 331 (R.I. 1977).
30. Id. at 333.
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Mrs. Kennedy had been injured by a hockey player's "body check" after
she had scaled a barrier and slid onto the ice to join her favorite team, her
conduct would have evidenced an unreasonable implied assumption of
risk.
The assumption of risk defense has been justified on two different
theories. The common justification is that the plaintiff's assumption of
risk relieves the defendant of the duty of ordinary care that he otherwise
would owe to the plaintiff. Under this theory, a plaintiff recovers nothing
from the defendant because the defendant, who had no duty to breach, was
simply not negligent. The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Kennedy
expressly followed this doctrinal approach.3' The other justification is
that the nature of the plaintiff's conduct should preclude recovery even
though the defendant may well have breached his duty and been negligent;
the plaintiff is thought an improper recipient of compensation because he
in some sense consented to the wrong.32
B. Comparative Negligence
Because the traditional contributory negligence doctrine totally bars
recovery by a contributorily negligent plaintiff, even if his negligence
contributes only insignificantly to his injury, the doctrine has been
criticized as harsh and unjust. 33 A significant majority of states have now
abandoned the rule that contributory negligence completely bars recovery,
and have substituted a rule of partial compensation for contributorily
negligent plaintiffs.34 The modern rule is known as comparative
negligence.
Comparative negligence calls for the fact-finder to determine the
percentage of the injury attributable to the negligence of each party
respectively.35 Comparative negligence jurisdictions separate into three
groups. First, under a system of "pure" comparative negligence, a
contributorily negligent plaintiff is simply allowed to recover for any
portion of his damages attributable to the defendant's conduct, but to
31. Id.: "Where one knowingly accepts a dangerous situation, he essentially absolves the
defendant of creating the risk or, put another way, the duty the defendant owes the plaintiff Is
terminated."
32. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Kemp, 327 S.W.2d 178, 183 (Mo. 1959): "The rationale of the
doctrine is that one who voluntarily exposes himself to a known and appreciated danger due to
the negligence of another may not recover for an injury resulting from such exposure .
Cf. Eisenhower v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 803, 806 (E.D.N.Y. 1963):
This doctrine may be invoked under two different sets of circumstances, (i) where defendant
had no duty to plaintiff, in which case plaintiff's assumption of risk is simply a counterpart of
the defendant's lack of duty, and (ii) where defendant has a duty to plaintiff but has breached
this duty and plaintiff, with full knowledge thereof, voluntarily and deliberately assumes the
risk of this breach.
33. W. PROSSER. supra note 20, § 67, at 433.
34. Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 339, 354-62, 366-73 (1977).
35. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp.
1977).
(Vol. 39:364
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receive no recompense for the portion traceable to his own negligence.3 6
The courts in both Kennedy and Blackburn were confronted with this
version of the doctrine. 7 Second, under "modified" comparative
negligence, a plaintiff can recover as under "pure" if and only if his
contribution to the injury is found to be "less than" (in somejurisdictions)
or "less than or equal to" (in other jurisdictions) the defendant's; if, on the
other hand, the plaintiff's contribution is found to be more than the
proportion specified, he is totally barred from recovery, as under
traditional contributory negligence doctrine: 8  Third, under a more
stringent variation of "modified" comparative negligence, a contributorily
negligent plaintiff recovers as in a "pure" system only if his negligence is
"slight" compared with the defendant's; otherwise, he is barred from any
recovery.
39
III. THE PROPER ROLE FOR AsSUMPTION OF RISK IN A
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE SYSTEM
The adoption of comparative negligence, which was designed to
mitigate the harshness of the contributory negligence defense, has
produced unanticipated repercussions among related tort doctrines.
Courts in comparative negligence jurisdictions have split on the
continuing vitality of the "last clear chance" and "wanton or willful
misconduct" doctrines, which had themselves mitigated the harshness of
contributory negligence prior to the advent of comparative negligence.40
Determining the effect of comparative negligence on the defense of
assumption of risk has proved to be particularly difficult for the courts.
A court could take one of three positions regarding the role of
assumption of risk in a comparative negligence system: (1) that assumption
of risk is unaffected by the adoption of comparative negligence, and that it
therefore remains a complete bar to recovery,4' (2) that assumption of risk,
though retaining an existence independent from contributory negligence,
is no longer a bar to recovery but is instead to be entered into the calculus
for determining the relative contributions of the plaintiff and defendant to
the injury suffered, 42 or (3) that assumption of risk is abolished as a defense
36. Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 339, 354-55, 366-71 (1977).
37. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1977); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla.
1973).
38. Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 339, 355-59 (1977).
39. Id. at 359-62.
40. Id. at386-92. In the absence of comparative negligence, a plaintiff is typically allowedfidl
recovery despite his contributory negligence if the defendant had the "last clear chance" to avoid the
harm, see W. PROssER, supra note 20, § 66, or if the defendant's conduct was notjust negligent but had
reached the level of "wanton or willful misconduct." See id. § 65, at 426.
41. The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Kennedy took this position. 376 A.2d at 332.
42. See, e.g., Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., 281 So. 2d 669, 677 (Miss. 1973) (holding that
assumption of risk is subject to comparative negligence rules when it overlaps with contributory
negligence).
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separate from contributory negligence.43  Because the three types of
assumption of risk-express, reasonable implied, and unreasonable
implied 44-present very different doctrinal, practical, and policy issues,
courts might properly take different positions concerning the role for each
type in a comparative negligence system.
A. Doctrinal Issues
One goal of a legal system is to maintain logical consistency and
doctrinal integrity among its rules of law. When purely doctrinal
constraints conflict with strong practical and policy considerations,
however, the doctrinal barriers must give way to the formulation of new
rules of law, backed by new doctrinal underpinnings. In integrating
assumption of risk into a comparative negligence system, the foremost
doctrinal constraint derives from the proposition that a plaintiff who
assumes the risk thereby relieves the defendant of the duty of care that he
would otherwise owe to the plaintiff.45
A superficial analysis of the problem posed by the juxtaposition of
assumption of risk and comparative negligence, relying upon logical
extensions of the "no duty" proposition, leads to a determination that
assumption of risk, unlike contributory negligence, cannot be subjected to
the apportionment of liability called for by comparative negligence. The
application of comparative negligence principles presupposes a defendant
who is negligent, that is, who has breached his duty of care to the plaintiff,
and is therefore at least partially liable for the plaintiff's damages. If the
plaintiff has, however, by assuming the risk, relieved the defendant of his
duty of care, the defendant has no duty to breach and thus cannot be
negligent. If the defendant is not negligent, he is not even partially
responsible for the plaintiff's damages. The apportionment question is
never reached.46
Unfortunately, the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Kenned)v allowed
itself to be bound by the trammels of the "no duty" doctrine and its logical
extension:
Where one knowingly accepts a dangerous situation, he essentially
absolves the defendant of creating the risk or, put another way, the duty the
defendant owes the plaintiff is terminated. For example, where a plaintiff
traditionally pleads negligence and a defendant responds with contributory
43. The Florida Supreme Court took this position in Blackburn for implied assumption of risk,
348 So. 2d at 292, although it refused to offer an opinion on express assumption of risk. Id. at 290.
44. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
45. See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
46. Dean Prosser has been criticized for taking the doctrinally inconsistent positions that (1)
assumption of risk relieves the defendant of his duty of care to the plaintiff and (2) assumption of
risk should not always be a complete bar to recovery, but should in certain cases be subject to compar-
ative negligence principles. Comment, Assumption of the Risk in Alaska After the Adoption
of Comparative Negligence, 6 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REV. 244, 248-49 (1977).
[Vol. 39:364
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negligence, the plaintiff can still plead last clear chance because the
defendant, despite the plaintiff's own negligence, still owes a duty to him.
But where a plaintiff pleads negligence and a defendant pleads assumption
of the risk, that is the end of the chain, because once the plaintiffaccepts the
risk, the defendant no longer owes a duty to him.
47
Given this unflinching adherence to the "no duty" proposition, the
Kennedy court's decision that assumption of risk remains a complete bar
to recovery is not surprising.
The Florida Supreme Court in Blackburn did not find itself
constrained by the "no duty" doctrine. Accordingly, the Blackburn court
was able to make major changes in the law regarding assumption of risk,
changes not possible for the Kennedy court, which felt obliged to follow
the logical mandates of established legal doctrine.
B. Practical Issues
A legal system should seek out rules of law that are susceptible to fair
and consistent implementation by courts and juries. As to the role of
assumption of risk in a comparative negligence system, no practical
problems of implementation result if a court decides either to retain
assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery or to abolish assumption
of risk as a concept independent of contributory negligence. Because the
Kennedy court took the former position, and the Blackburn court the
latter, neither decision presents practical difficulties.
Practical problems do present themselves if a determination is made
that assumption of risk, retaining independent significance separate from
contributory negligence, is to be subject to comparative negligence
principles, i.e., a plaintiff's assumption of risk is to be compared with the
defendant's negligence for the purpose of apportioning liability. The
problems of implementing a comparative approach differ depending upon
the type of assumption of risk involved.
Asking ajury to compare a plaintiff's express assumption of risk with
a defendant's negligent conduct is like asking it whether an elephant is
grayer than a fish is wet.48 Even if not backed by consideration, an express
statement by the plaintiff to the defendant that he assumes a risk of harm
from the defendant's negligence in some sense "sounds" in contract.
49
Contractual promises are either enforceable or unenforceable; 50 they
cannot realistically be said to have, say, a 37% effect on legal responsibility.
47. 376 A.2d at 333.
48. The elephant/fish analogy is taken from Professor Robert J. Nordstrom, who used it to
pedagogical advantage teaching contracts at the Ohio State University College of Law.
49. As to statements unsupported by consideration, cf. RESTATEMENT OF CoN MAcrs § 90 (1932)
(reliance can be substitute for ordinary consideration).
50. See L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 6-7 (1965). RSTATEmENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 496B (1965) recognizes that certain statements of express assumption of risk are invalid as
against public policy.
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It would be foolish and unjust to request a fact-finder to decide how much
of the plaintiff's injury should be attributed to the defendant's negligence,
and how much should be attributed to the express promise of the plaintiff
to hold the defendant harmless. The results under such a system would be
meaningless and arbitrary.
The elephant and fish problem is not so pronounced with implied
assumption of risk of either the reasonable or unreasonable variety.
When this type of assumption of risk defense is presented, the jury is
charged with evaluating the conduct of each of two parties in relation to a
certain risk of harm, and determining the degree to which each should be
held liable for damages ensuing when that risk of harm has resulted in
actual injuries. If it is "folly" to attempt an apportionment of liability in
these circumstances, 51 it is folly differing only in degree, and not in kind,
from the apportionment of liability in the typical comparative negligence
case of a negligent defendant and a contributorily negligent plaintiff.
In the typical comparative negligence case, thejury is asked to decide,
on a percentage basis, the degree to which the negligence of the defendant
and plaintiff respectively contributed to the plaintiff's damages. Suppose
that a negligent defendant homeowner has failed to remove a dead tree
limb that hangs over the city street in front of his house, and the limb falls
and hits the car of a contributorily negligent plaintiff whose inadvertence
had kept him from stopping the car short of where the limb fell. The
jury goes out, and returns with a verdict: "Defendant-65% responsible.
Plaintiff-35% responsible." It would indeed be folly to view these
percentages as any more than gross estimates of the degree to which each
party's conduct contributed to the injury. But the law tolerates this
inexactitude in order to achieve some semblance of fairness between two
parties who were each "wrong" in their conduct. 52 This semblance of
fairness is believed superior to the traditional contributory negligence
system, wherein one of the "wrong" parties, the plaintiff, must sustain the
entire loss, while the other party, the defendant, is held unaccountable.
Allowing the fact-finder to assess a plaintiff's implied assumption of
risk does not pose appreciably greater practical difficulties in the
apportionment process than allowing it to consider a plaintiff's
contributory negligence. To vary slightly the example suggested above,
suppose that the plaintiff driver had often driven by and viewed the dead
limb, subjectively recognized that the limb appeared ready to fall at any
time, and nonetheless decided to drive under it rather than take an equally
51. Comment, Comparative Negligence Legislation: Continuing Controversy over the Doctrine
of Assumption of the Risk in Oregon, 53 ORE. L. REV. 79, 92 (1973).
52. "The law consistently seeks to elevate justice and equity above the exact contours of a
mathematical equation." Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,742,575 P.2d 1162,1172, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 390 (1978) (holding comparative negligence apportionment principlcs applicable in
products liability cases).
[Vol. 39:364
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convenient route. Suppose that the jury found that his conduct was
unreasonable and that he had disregarded a subjectively known risk of
harm. This unreasonable implied assumption of risk might result in
percentage findings of responsibility somewhat less in the plaintiff's favor
than in the example first put, in which the unreasonable, contributorily
negligent plaintiff had not subjectively appraised the risk. Perhaps the
defendant would be found only 55% responsible, and the plaintiff 45%.
On the other hand, suppose that from the road the limb did not look like it
would fall, and the plaintiff, having subjectively perceived the risk that it
might fall, reasonably decided that his chances of being hit by the limb
were slight; he decided to continue to take his customary route under the
limb. This non-negligent plaintiff, who reasonably assumed the risk of the
falling tree limb, might receive a verdict holding the defendant, say, 85%
responsible for the injuries that resulted when the limb did in fact fall, and
the plaintiff would bear 15% of the loss himself. If the non-negligent
plaintiff had never before driven by the tree, and thus had not knowingly
encountered the risk of harm, he would recover 100%, because he had
neither assumed the risk nor been contributorily negligent.
C. Policy Issues
The paramount goal of a legal system is to develop rules of law that
reflect a sensitive balancing of all relevant considerations of public policy.
Assuming that a court is not content to perpetuate existing rules of law in
the name of doctrinal consistency, 3 and having determined that practical
constraints preclude apportionment only in the case of express assumption
of risk,54 the question remains: What-in terms of appropriate public
policy-should be the role for assumption of risk in a comparative
negligence system? Each type of assumption of risk presents different
policy concerns.
1. Express Assumption of Risk
Because practical considerations preclude its apportionment under
comparative negligence principles, express assumption of risk must either
be abrogated as a defense, allowing a plaintiff full recovery despite his
express statement that he would assume the risk of harm from the
defendant's negligent conduct, or remain a complete bar to recovery. On
policy grounds, express assumption of risk must surely remain viable as a
bar to recovery, irrespective of the adoption of comparative negligence.
Simply put, a party can waive his rights, and others must be protected in
their reliance on such a waiver.
A dissenting judge in one of the Florida court of appeals cases that
53. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
54. See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
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was consolidated for review in Blackburn, apparently believing that the
majority of his court was abolishing the express assumption of risk
defense, suggested a hypothetical case to show the equities involved when
such a defense is presented. 55  In the hypothetical example, Mr.
Goodhearted grudgingly agreed to drive Mr. Persistent home from a
party, on the express condition that Persistent was assuming the risks
involved in riding with Goodhearted, including Goodhearted's poor
vision, impaired reflexes, and the defective brakes on his car.:" A collision
occurred on the ride home, and Persistent sued Goodhearted for injuries
suffered.57 The dissenting judge could not "conceive under any system of
justice how Persistent could be permitted to recover."' 8
Because the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Kennedy retained
implied assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery, 59 the court
would, a fortiori, recognize express assumption of risk as a bar. On the
other hand, the Florida Supreme Court in Blackburn specifically refused
to venture an opinion on the effect of express assumption of risk after the
state's adoption of comparative negligence.60 If confronted with the issue
directly, however, the Florida court would presumably follow the Rhode
Island approach, retaining the express assumption of risk defense as a
complete bar to recovery.
2. Reasonable Implied Assumption of Risk
The proper role for implied assumption of risk of the reasonable
variety is debatable even in the absence of comparative negligence, because
competing policy considerations are present. On the one hand, the
plaintiff has voluntarily encountered a known risk, and one might argue
that public policy "refuses to permit one who manifests willingness that
another shall continue in a course of conduct to complain of it later if he is
hurt as a result of it.' '61 On the other hand, the plaintiff has, by definition,
acted as a reasonable man would act when confronted with the same
situation.
In a state that has adopted comparative negligence, a court-
depending on the importance it places on each of the competing policy
55. Parker v. Maule Indust., Inc., 321 So. 2d 106, 107-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (Boyer,
C.J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 107.
57. Id. at 107-08.
58. Id. at 108 (emphasis in original).
59. 376 A.2d at 332.
60. 348So. 2dat290. The court's definition of express assumption of risk, which was excepted
from its general abrogation of the assumption of risk defense, was expan.ive, According to the court,
express assumption of risk is present in "situations in which actual consent exists such as where one
voluntarily participates in a contact sport." Id. Florida attorneys representing defendants will
undoubtedly attempt to distinguish Blackburn by arguing that "actual consent," in this broad sense,
was present in their cases.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C, comment b (1965)
[Vol. 39:364
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concerns-could take one of three positions vis-a-vis reasonable implied
assumption of risk: (1) that the defense remains a complete bar to recovery,
(2) that the defense is a partial one only, calling for apportionment of
responsibility under comparative negligence principles, or (3) that the
defense is abolished, allowing the plaintiff full recovery despite his
reasonable implied assumption of risk. The starkest contrast between the
Rhode Island Supreme Court decision in Kennedy and the decision of the
Florida Supreme Court in Blackburn arises from each court's treatment of
this aspect of assumption of risk. The Rhode Island court retained the
defense as a complete bar.62 The Florida court, on the other hand,
expressly stated that-to the extent that such a defense had existed in
Florida prior to the adoption of comparative negligence-the defense was
nbw abolished, and would in no way limit a plaintiff's recovery.63 An
examination of the flaws in each court's reasoning will demonstrate that
neither of these extreme positions is justified, and that reasonable implied
assumption of risk ought instead to be subjected to the apportionment
principles of comparative negligence.
The Rhode Island court in Kennedy, in upholding reasonable implied
assumption of risk as a complete bar, emphasized that a plaintiff who
voluntarily encounters a known risk has "consented to the possibility of
harm, 64 and as such is more culpable than and "worlds apart from one
who unwittingly and unsuspectingly falls prey to another's negligence.
' 65
In distinguishing assumption of risk from the defense of contributory
negligence, the court said, "When one acts knowingly, it is immaterial
whether he acts reasonably."66
Even though reasonableness is immaterial in determining whether
some form of implied assumption of risk is present, reasonableness is
crucial in properly affixing legal responsibility. The Kennedy decision
leads to an anomaly in Rhode Island: an unreasonable plaintiff, i.e., one
who is contributorily negligent, might receive partial compensation under
comparative negligence principles, while a reasonable plaintiff receives no
compensation if he has impliedly assumed the risk.
The Florida opinion in Blackburn exemplifies opposite but equally
inappropriate reasoning. Emphasizing that a reasonable plaintiff should
not be penalized in his recovery, the court inaccurately labeled an extreme
hypothetical example as reasonable implied assumption of risk, and
concluded that-in light of the state's adoption of comparative
negligence--"there is no reason supported by law or justice in this state to
give credence to such a principle of law."
67
62. 376 A.2d at 332.
63. 348 So. 2d at 291.
64. 376 A.2d at 333.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 348 So. 2d at 291.
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In the Blackburn court's hypothetical case, a plaintiff tenant was
injured while rushing into his apartment to save his infant child from a
raging fire caused by the defendant landlord's negligence. The court
concluded that the hypothetical plaintiff had voluntarily encountered a
known risk, and that, were the court to recognize the reasonable implied
assumption of risk defense, it would apply in this type of situation.68 The
court's rather obvious error was to conclude that the hypothetical
plaintiff's conduct was in any sense "voluntary" within the meaning of the
assumption of risk doctrine. It is black letter law that the "plaintiff's
acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant's tortious conduct has
left him no reasonable alternative course of conduct in order to .. .avert
harm to himself or another. ... 69 The court's analysis was fatally
flawed by its reliance on this straw man hypothetical.
The Florida court might better have considered a set of facts actually
within the reasonable implied assumption of risk defense, such as the facts
of Rhode Island's Kennedy case. In Kennedy, it was found as a matter
of fact that Mrs. Kennedy-because she had witnessed the possible
consequences of pucks lofting from the ice-had subjectively turned her
attention to the risk of being hit by a puck.70 She was found, in effect, to
have said to herself, "I might get hit by a hockey puck. I realize and
understand that. But I like to watch hockey, and I'll take my chances. 7 1
Even though her decision was perfectly reasonable in light of the slim
chance that she would actually be hit, it would seemjust and fair for the law
to recompense her more grudgingly than a first-time hockey spectator who
had no idea that he might get hit by a puck.
Because competing and equally weighty policy considerations exist
when a plaintiff has acted reasonably but knowingly, the proper approach
to the reasonable implied assumption of risk defense in a comparative
negligence system is a compromise between the extreme positions taken in
Kennedy and Blackburn. The fact-finder should be allowed to apportion
liability under comparative negligence principles when this defense is
applicable. The fact-finder should consider the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's conduct, but should also consider the fact that the plaintiff had
in some sense "taken his chances" concerning the possibility of injury. This
approach is not precluded by practical constraints, 72 and would allow a
jury to consider the particular equities in a given case. The approach
would also further the comparative negligence policy of apportioning
liability in accordance with comparative fault or culpability, rather than
holding either the defendant or the plaintiff exclusively responsible. The
68. Id.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E(2)(a) (1965).
70. 376 A.2d at 333.
71. "Assumption of risk rests on plaintiffs voluntary consent to take his chances .
Meulners v. Hawkes, 299 Minn. 76, 80, 216 N.W.2d 633, 635 (1974).
72. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
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law ought not seek out black or white solutions when a compromise of gray
comes closer to achieving fairness.
3. Unreasonable Implied Assumption of Risk
Unreasonable implied assumption of risk presents the case of a
plaintiff who has subjectively recognized a risk of harm, and who has then
proceeded to encounter the risk even though it was unreasonable to do so.
Surely the law should treat this plaintiff with less favor than either the
plaintiff who encounters a risk unreasonably but unknowingly or the one
who knowingly encounters a risk but is reasonable in his decision to do so.
That is, unreasonable implied assumption of risk is more "wrongful" than
either purely objective contributory negligence 3 or reasonable implied
assumption of risk.
Because of the plaintiff's heightened culpability when he has
proceeded knowingly as well as unreasonably, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's decision in Kennedy, retaining assumption of risk as a complete
bar even though purely objective contributory negligence is but a partial
defense, can be defended as it relates to unreasonable implied assumption
of risk. Dean Prosser, however, has suggested that such a decision is not
defensible:
It can scarcely be supposed in reason that the legislature has intended to
allow a partial recovery to the plaintiff who has been so negligent as not to
discover his peril at all, and deny it to one who has at least exercised proper
care in that respect, but has made a mistake of judgment in proceeding to
encounter the danger after it is known. 4
Prosser's view is apparently this: One who acts unreasonably (i.e., who
"has made a mistake of judgment") in deciding to encounter a risk of harm
that he has discovered has at least as much desert as one who has been
unreasonable (i.e., who "has been . . . negligent") in failing to discover
the risk in the first instance. Despite the superficial appeal of his
argument, Prosser's policy position is dubious at best. It suggests that, as
between two unreasonable plaintiffs, one whose unreasonable conduct was
premised on a conscious appreciation of what he was doing should be
treated as kindly as one whose unreasonableness was founded on
inadvertence alone. Prosser's position withers further in the face of its
application to concrete factual circumstances. Under Prosser's approach,
for example, the law would treat an absent-minded plaintiff pedestrian,
who failed to notice that an oncoming car was out of control, no more
generously than a pedestrian who saw the car, but said, "Oh, what the
heck! I'll take my chances and hope that he misses me."
73. Unreasonable implied assumption of risk can be thought of as contributory negligence with
an added subjective component. As noted above, assumption of risk overlaps with contributory
negligence when the assumption of risk is unreasonable. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
74. W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 68, at 457.
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Even though the Rhode Island "complete bar" approach to
unreasonable implied assumption of risk reflects the sound policy of
treating plaintiffs who are more culpable with less favor than those who are
less culpable, it is an unnecessarily harsh doctrine. In a comparative
negligence system, the goal is a fair apportionment of liability between the
plaintiff and defendant when both are wrongdoers. It is inconsistent and
unjust to place the entire loss upon one of those wrongdoers, i.e., the
plaintiff, simply because his wrongful conduct includes the element of
subjective knowledge.
The Florida Supreme Court in Blackburn took the view that
unreasonable implied assumption of risk was nothing more than
contributory negligence, and should have no independent significance."
The unreasonableness of the plaintiff would be considered in comparative
negligence apportionment, 76 but the fact that he knowingly and
voluntarily encountered the risk would be irrelevant.
The Blackburn court apparently felt that the knowing, "what the
heck" plaintiff should be treated on par with one who "unwittingly and
unsuspectingly falls prey to another's negligence."" To the contrary, the
law should properly view unreasonable implied assumption of risk, with its
subjective fault component, with less favor than mere contributory
negligence, which is based on objective fault alone,
The most appropriate resolution of the issue would once again be a
compromise. The plaintiff's unreasonable implied assumption of risk
should not bar his recovery altogether, nor should his subjective appraisal
of the risk of harm be disregarded as irrelevant. Instead, the fact-finder
should be permitted to consider the plaintiff's subjective knowledge of the
risk, as well as his unreasonableness, in applying comparative negligence
apportionment principles. This approach is not precluded by practical
concerns,78 and allows thejury to consider all relevant evidence concerning
fault, not just part of it.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Kennedy and Blackburn cases are examples of unsound decisions
concerning the assumption of risk defense in a comparative negligence
system, decisions based on incomplete analysis and deficient reasoning.
This writer's appraisal of doctrinal, practical, and policy issues suggests
that (1) express assumption of risk should remain a complete bar to
recovery, and (2) implied assumption of risk of both the reasonable and
unreasonable varieties should be subjected to comparative negligence
75. 348 So. 2d at 291-92.
76. Id. at 293.
77. Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 376 A.2d 329, 333 (R.I. 1977).
78. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
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apportionment principles, under which the fact-finder would consider the
plaintiff's subjective appreciation of the risk of harm that he decided to
encounter. The result would be a more just allocation of legal liability for
losses resulting from tortious conduct.
Daniel 0. Conkle
